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Did the Court of Appeals misconstrue and misapply
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to
immunize America Online, Inc. from liabi lity for its
negligence and to apply the Act in such a way as to bar
Petitioner's recovery for acts which significantly predated the
adoption of the Act?
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Petitioner KENNETH ZERAN respectfully prays that
based upon significant questions as to the construction and
application of Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (the "CDA") stated in the Questions Presented herein this
Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which
affirmed entry by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia of judgment on the pleadings
dismissing ZERAN's pending action under Rule 12(c) of the
Fed.R.Civ.P.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit denying Petitioner's motion for rehearing
with suggestion for en bane review without opinion has not
been reported but in reproduced in the Appendix. (App. A19) The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affu1l1ing the United States Distriet Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia was reported at 129 F.3d 327
(4th Cir. 1997) (App. A).
The Order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissing the action was reported
at 958 F.Supp. 1124 (E.D.Va. 1997).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ("Court of Appeals") was entered on
November 12, 1997. The Order of the Court of Appeals
denying Petitioner's timely motion for rehearing with
suggestion for en bane review was dated and entered
December 9, 1997. (App. B).
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.c. §
1254(1).
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
reads as follows:

(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to inforrnaticm content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
(d) Effect on other laws

Section 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING
AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.
(b) It is the policy of the United States-(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking and harassment by means of
computer.
(c) Protection for 'good samaritan' blocking and
screening of offensive material.

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of:
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene
lewd lascivious filthy, excessively violent,
harassing or otherwise objectionable whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected' or

(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impair the enforcement of section 223 of this
title chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 11 0
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of
Title 18, or any other criminal statute.
. . ....
(3) State Law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent any state from enforcing any State law
that is consistent with this section. No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.

47 U.S.c. § 223 provides:
Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the
District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign
communications
(a) Prohibited general purposes
Whoever-(1) in interstate or foreign communications
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A. Procedural Background and The Complaint

(C) makes a telephone call or utilizes a
telecommunication device, whether or not the
conversation or communication ensues, without
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy,
abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called
number or who receives the communication.

shall be fmed under Title 18, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Two fundamental questions are presented by this case:
(1) whether Section 230(c) of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c),
can be properly construed to immunize proprietary computer
online service providers ("OSPs") from state common law
negligence liability, by absolving them from any legal duty to
injured parties in their capacity as distributors of defamatory,
fraudulent, harassing, or otherwise injurious subject matter
after receiving actual notice that such subject matter was being
posted on their own proprietary bulletin boards, and (2)
whether the CDA which became effective February 6, 1996,
was properly invoked to bar a claim which arose during April
and May of 1995, but which was not filed until after the
effective date of the CDA.
For purposes of this Petition it is accepted that
Respondent AMERICA ONLINE, INC. ("AOL") failed to use
reasonable care to expeditiously delete the offending posting,
prevent its reposting or post an appropriate notice itself of the
bogus nature of the subject matter.

ZERAN filed his complaint on April 23, 1996, in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
l
Oklahoma. Discovery ensued. Respondent AOL moved to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) of the
Fed.R.Civ.P. and/or to transfer the action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The motion
to transfer was granted and the motion to dismiss reserved for
the transferee court and the case was then transferred on
October 28, 1996. Discovery continued. Respondent next
moved pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Fed.R.Civ.P. for
judgment on the pleadings and concurrently withdrew its
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Fed.R.Civ.P. Oral argument was held on the motion on
February 28, 1997, after which the District Court stayed
discovery. The court granted AOL's motion on March 21,
1997.
ZERAN's complaint averred that ZERAN, an
accomplished
artist,
photographer,
filmmaker,
and
interviewer, operating out of his home in Seattle, Washington,
publicized his telephone in connection with various
businesses.
On April 25, 1995, in the wake of the unprecedented
terrorist act in the April 19th bombing of the Murrah building
in Oklahoma City, an unidentified AOL user posted on AOL
bulletin boards the availability for sale "Naughty Oklahoma
T-Shirts" which listed the notice to be "From: Ken ZZ03,,2,
I On January 4, 1996, before the effective date of the CDA, alleging
facts identical to those contained in the AOL Complaint, plaintiff sued an
Oklahoma City radio station that broadcast the original AOL posting. (cf.
Ex. A and Ex. B to AOL's Brief in Support of Its Rule 12 Motion to
Dismiss or, In The Alternative, To Transfer).

2

"Ken ZZ03" is a "screen name" utilized by AOL members, the true
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giving ZERAN's Seattle business phone. ZERAN, never
having been an AOL member, first discovered the existence
of the posting from a journalist that had located it on the
bulletin board of the Michigan Military Movement. The
listing was a vicious, cruel hoax designed to generate outrage
at the purported seller in all those who read it or heard about
it. 3

declined to post any such notice on its system and the posting
remained on andlor was reposted with slightly different screen
names, always using ZERAN's telephone number, for at least
a week. As a result of AOL's failure to expeditiously delete
the posting andlor prevent the repeated further postings bl
failing to take adequate electronic blocking measures
ZERAN's telephone was tied up with obscene, harassing
telephone calls and he endured the further dissemination of
the bogus posting attributed to him through a radio broadcast
on an Oklahoma City station on May 1, 1995, which
generated extremely violent, aggressive phone calls including
numerous death threats.

When ZERAN was notified of the posting, that same
day he notified AOL both by telephone and later by letter
requesting that the posting be deleted and that appropriate
notice be placed on AOL that the posting was bogus. 4 AOL
identity of the member being generally known only to AOL. AOL
maintains a database with the name, addresses, phone numbers and credit
card numbers of each member searchable by screen name. In the case of
the person posting the "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts", he was able to
provide false information to AOL so as to avoid detection, because AOL
did not verify member information before allowing the new member to go
online utilizing one of the trial memberships that AOL disseminated by the
millions through direct mail, in magazines and books and loaded 011 to the
hard disks of new computers. AOL's irial memberships offering free hours
of OIl-line time are so ubiquitous that the court and its staff have
undoubtedly received more than one. ill the case of Ken Z033, after that
membership he fraudulenUy obtained was terminated, be used at least two
more AOL memberships with bogus information and similar screen names
(Ken ZZ033 and Ken Z033) to post increasingly offensive items for sale.
3 At a time when bodies were still being dug out of the rubble of the
Murrah bombing and funerals for victims were being conducted by the
dozens, the "naughty" t-shirts included the slogans "Rack'em, Stack'em and
Pack'em-Oklaboma \995", "Putting the Kids to bed . . . Oklahoma 1995"
and "McVeigh for President 1996". Subsequent bogus postillgs added
"Forget the rescue let the maggors take over-Oklahoma 1995" and "Finally
a day care center that can keep the kids quiet-Oklahoma 1995". Zeran,
958 F.Supp. at 1127 n. 5.

4 Since he was not an AOL member, Petitioner had no capability to
respond to these postings with his own disclaimers of his innocence p]aced
throughout the AOL system. Since he was not an AOL member, Petitioner
is in a very different position from AOL members and AOL's refusal to
post such disclaimers was a breach of its duty of care to Petitjoner.

ZERAN sued AOL for negligence as a distributor for
failure to exercise a reasonable standard of care to protect
ZERAN from the foreseeable consequences of the bogus
posting. ZERAN averred in his complaint that AOL owed a
duty of care as a substantial commercial operator of its own
computer bulletin board, after receiving actual notice of the
offending posting, to take appropriate remedial action such as
screening out the incendiaryandlor bogus material as well as
his telephone number posted on its computer bulletin board
service. The complaint expressly averred that AOL was on
constructive notice by reason of the law enunciated in Cubby,
lnc. v. Co mpuServe, lnc. el al. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) that it was obligated after due notice to be able to
screen incendiary, defamatory andlor bogus material a
standard applied to interactive computer services providers in
their capacity as distributors of infonnation as determined in

5 Petitioner alleged that readily available internal computer procedures
and/or computer programs existed which would have allowed AOL to
block any further attempts to place more postings on AOL using
Petitioner's phone number. With a blocking program in effect, any such
Ken Z postings would have been intercepted by AOL before they appeared
on AOL's service. Liabllity for negligence in adopting blocking measures
is one of Petitioner's distributor theories.
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Cubby, Inc. 6
With the significant exception of the court's
characterization of this case as one involving the Internet7, the
facts were fairly presented by the District Court. By way of
emphasis the facts establish that AOL had actual notice of the
damaging bogus posting on its proprietary computer bulletin
board through the direct notification by ZERAN himself to
AOL's personnel, both oral and by letter. Secondly ZERAN
was not a member of AOL and had no standing or ability to
protect himself as to the bogus posting using his first name,
distinctive initial and telephone number. Thirdly, the
averments that AOL had the capability or should have had the
capability of screening and blocking the bogus posting, after
having received actual notice, is deemed true.
That the complaint fairly states a claim for negligence
based upon the standard applied to a distributor (as compared
with a publisher) of content is not at issue. 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va.), affd. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
Both courts below insisted on casting Petitioner's claim as a defamation
claim (e.g. "Although Zeran artfully attempts to plead his claims as ones of
negligence ... ", 129 F.3d at 332), despite Petitioner's specific allegations
of fault-based acts which breached common law duties of care imposed on
AOL. Moreover, the "artfully" comment which implies some last-minute
attempt to plead around § 230, ignores the specific rebuttal to similar
assertions by AOL, including letters from Petitioner's counsel to AOL
asserting distributor negligence months before the CDA was adopted. (see
Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
at 6-8, especially Exs. D, June 26, 1995, letter and E, August 4, 1995, letter
to the Affidavit of Leo Kayser, III).
6

7As more fully discussed below, this case involves a private, proprietary,
member-only OSP with many features unique to AOL and strict rules
governing member online conduct-a stark contrast to the free-for-all nature
of the Internet characterized by the court. 958 F.Supp. at 1126, ft. I.
Indeed, the use of OSPs such as AOL as a gateway to the Internet (no one
can get into AOL from the Internet except AOL members) is completely
irrelevant to the events of this case.

The District Court in granting AOL's motion for
judgment on the pleadings equated publisher liability with
distributor liability for purposes of § 230(c) of the CDA, even
though § 230(c) does not use the word distributor or in any
way indicate the intent of Congress to overrule Cubby, Inc.,
supra, which held computer service providers to be treated as
distributors and not as publishers for purposes of liability with
respect to injurious content posted on their proprietary
systems. The import of Cubby, Inc. was to absolve such
providers from any legal duty to screen, block or otherwise
edit in the course of postings or transmissions any of the
content that might appear on their systems in the absence of
notice. On the other hand, with notice, such providers still had
a duty to persons who foreseeably could be injured due to
content posted on their systems on the analogous basis of a
bookstore, news vendor, or library.
B. Background Prior to Enactment of
Section 230 of the CDA
The scienter standard as applied to distributors of
content is compelled by the First Amendment as noted by the
Cubby, Inc. court:
The requirement that a distributor must have
knowledge of the contents of a publication before
liability can be imposed for distributing that
publication is deeply rooted in the First
Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 139.
(Emphasis added, citing Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959)).
Then, in 1995 Stratton-Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy
Service Co., Inc., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 24,
1995) was decided, in which that court held that a cyberspace
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distributor, in part, because it was prescreening some content
for distasteful words, was held to be a publisher and, thus,
strictly liable for false information published on one of its
bulletin boards. Unlike, ZERAN, no notice had been given to
allegedly
false
information
by
Prodigy of the
Stratton-Oakmont or anyone else.

defined in the CDA or its legislative history, encompasses
distributors, such as AOL. Secondly, the trial court
determined that the Congressional intent of promoting content
monitoring would be undermined unless distribution liability
was deemed preempted.

The legislative history on § 230 of the CDA
demonstrates expressly that the purpose of § 230, was to
overrule Stratton-Oakmont, supra, and encourage computer
services providers to edit, screen out or block offensive
content without risk of exposure to liability as a publisher.

The Fourth Circuit adopted the District Court's
conclusions, but went well beyond the statute and legislative
history in finding a broad objective to promote free speech in
a provision of the CDA crafted to encourage content screening
and blocking of certain content.

D. The Lower Courts Have Misconstrued The Statute
Specifically, the Conference Report on Section 230
stated:
One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is
to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any
other similar decisions which have treated such
providers and users as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have

restricted access to objectionable material.
(Emphasis added.)
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). The headings for
§ 230 and § 230( c) quoted above, make it express that the
purpose of the statute is to provide protection for "private
blocking and screening of offensive material" and for "Good
Samaritan Blocking and Screening" consistent with the
overruling of Stratton-Oakmont. Nothing in § 230(c) overrules
the actual notice standard for distributorship liability
enunciated in Cubby, Inc.
C. Decisions of the District Court and Fourth Circuit

The District Court rested its decision on two grounds
concluding that the term "publisher or speaker" which is not

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
exaggerated the burden placed on OSPs like AOL which
would arise from imposing distributor liability on them based
upon Petitioner's claim. Whereas because of the many
transmissions daily it would be virtually impossible for either
an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") or major OSP to screen
them in advance (consistent with the duty of a publisher),
because of the availability of electronic means such as
blocking programs (alleged in the Complaint), proprietary
OSP's like AOL can meet the demands of distributor liability
(need to act arises only after notice) regardless of the volume
of their system traffic. This distinction supports § 230(c) as
having been designed by Congress to impact only publishers
and to avoid the Prodigy case results-a distinction that escaped
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
Moreover
both Courts' construction of an
impossibility of meeting the duty of a distributor in addition
to having inconectly supplied a intent for Congress that is
patently missing from the Act jtself (i.e. Congress was aware
of the publisher and distributor dichotomy from StrattonOakmont and Cubby, Inc. and could have easily added
"distributor" in § 230(c)(1), but did not do so) the Circuit
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Court also necessarily pronounces the policy behind § 230 as
being a futile goal.

In making this analysis as a matter of policy, the
Fourth Circuit has manifestly departed from any accepted rule
of judicial construction and invaded the province of the
legislature in its rationale for affirming the District Court on
such reasoning. The construction of § 230 of the CDA does
not represent a faithful interpretation of congressional intent.
Section 230 was plainly intended to encourage interactive
computer services to restrict access to injurious content. 9
Under the rule announced below, computer service providers
would be completely immune from any liability, and therefore
would have no incentive to respond to notification by parties,
especially non-AOL members, being injured by posted
content-especially those posted anonymously because of
AOL's corporate policy of allowing prospective "members" to
go online before their identity is confirmed.

1. Section 230(c)( 1)
Although the term publisher is not defined in the
statute legislative history shows that Congress was concerned
about publisher liability as imposed in Stratton-Oakmont
supra, wherein the court there expressly distinguished between
publishers, on the one hand, and distributors, such as AOL. It
was this narrow definition, and not a broader definition taken
from the Restatement of Torts relied upon by the lower courts,
that Congress intended to incorporate in the CDA. Secondly,
the policy of promoting online content screening would be
furthered not undern1ined if § 230(c) were construed to allow
distributor liability because of the effect of subsection (2) of
the Good Samaritan exemption which the Fourth Circuit
failed to address. The intent of Congress was to codify the
standard set forth in Cubby, Inc.
The Fourth Circuit also engaged in a sweeping policy
declaration, divorced from any specific reference to § 230 or
legislative history that:
If computer service providers were subject to
distributor liability, they would face liability each
time they receive notice of a potentially
defamatory statement--from any party, concerning
any message. 8

8 Contrary to the Cirouit Court's assertion of the burden on OSPs by
treating AOL as a distributor, AOL asserted itself to be a distributor and
not a publisher (see' 2.7. to Addendum to Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Hearing En Banc) and AOL had already specifically
reserved the right to itself to police its service and terminate memberships
for improper conduct in violation of detailed Terms of Service and Rules of
the Road. (, 8.2, Id.).

2. Section 230(d)(3)
Congress has expressly limited the impact of the CDA
on existing state laws by providing that only those state laws
inconsistent with the other subparts of the section are
unenforceable. Congress provided specific restrictions on
liability of an "interactive computer service" to either "actions
taken in good faith to restrict access to the availability" of
9 In a floor colloquy between the House authors, Congressman Cox
stated:

Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive for online
service providers to create family friendly services by detecting
and removing objectionable content. These providers face the risk
of increased liability if they police their systems. . . The CoxWyden amendment removes the liability of providers such as
Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort to edit the smut
from their systems. 141 Congo Rec. H 8460, 8471 (August 5,

1995).
Contrary to the clear purpose of the CDA, the effect of the
Circuit's decision is to reward OSPs like AOL that do absolutely nothingthe proverbial "Bad Samaritan".
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certain material (§ 230(c)(2)(A» or "any action taken to
enable or make available to infonnation content providers or
others technical means to restrict access to material described
in paragraph (1)." (§ 230(c)(2)(B».
Given these limitations on the immunity provided by
the CDA, imposing liability on AOL for its negligence under
traditional state tort principles is not inconsistent with the
purpose of the Act.
E. The Petitioner's Claims Were Not Barred
Even Though the Petitioner's Suit Was
Filed After the Effective Date of the CDA.
The events which give rise to negligence liability for
AOL under traditional state tort concepts occurred in April
and early May, 1995. The CDA was signed into law in
February, 1996. Long prior to adoption of the CDA, plaintiff
was setting forth the operative facts of this case and asserting
his entitlement to damages from AOL under theories of
liability then cognizable.
The issue before this Court is the impact of both
Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483
(1994) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Us. ex rei. Schumer,
U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 1871 (1997) and whether the Court will
further extend its retroactivity jurisprudence.
In Landgraf and its companion case, Rivers v.
Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298,114 S.Ct. 1510 (1994), the
Court considered whether two sections of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 should be given retroactive effect to a decision on
appeal. The initial inquiry is whether Congress has provided
for such a retroactive effect. The court observed:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted
after the events in suit, the court's first task is to
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detennine whether Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress
has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to
judicial default rules. Id. at 1505. 10
In Landgraf the court meticulously reviewed the
legislative history and statutory language of the Civil Rights
Act and detennined that Congressional intent to apply the new
provisions retroactively was not justified. Id, at 1489-96. In
Landgraf the court noted:
A statement that a statute will become effective on
a certain date does not even arguably suggest that
it has any application to conduct that occurred at
an earlier date. Id. at 1491.
In the absence of express Congressional intent or
through application of the rules of statutory interpretation if
retroactivity is not found, then other rules must be looked to:
When, however, the statute contains no such
express command, the court must detennine
whether the new statute would have retroactive
effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already completed. If
the statute would operate retroactively, our
traditional presumption teaches that it does not
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring
such a result. Id. at 1505.

In Hughes Aircraft, the Court cautioned that Landgraf
10 AOL does not argue that Congress has specifically provided for
retroactive effect of § 230 of the CDA-and Congress undoubtedly could
have done so.
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does not purport to define the outer limit of
impermissible retroactivity. Rather, our opinion
in Landgraf, like that of Justice Story, merely
described that any such effect constituted a
sufficient ll , rather than a necessary, condition
for invoking the presumption against
retroactivity . . . and made no suggestion that
Justice Story's formulation was the exclusive
definition of presumptively impermissible
retroactive legislation. Hughes Aircraft, 117
S.Ct. at 1876.
The Circuit Court appears to hold that retroactively
(i.e. after all of the seminal events have been completed)
effecting the elements of causes of action (or completely
eliminating all available causes of action) is different if the
party is a plaintiff than if it is a defendant-a one way street
over which only defendants may travel. Nothing in Landgraf
as explicated by Hughes Aircrqft so limits the rights free from
retroactive denial to only defendants or would not extend the
protection of the law for plaintiffs to events which predated
the adoption of the legislation. The focus of the
LandgraflHughes Aircraft analysis is the "potential unfairness
of retroactive application". Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. The
Court of Appeals quite simply "attached new consequences to
a completed act". Id.
It would be manifestly unfair under these circumstances to deprive Petitioner of well-established state tort
remedies against AOL for its negligence in taking no action or
long-overdue action when finally goaded by the FBI, Secret
II "i.e whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party's liabiJity for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed." LandgraJat 1505. Arguably if
the Landgraf examples were the outer limjts of retroactivity; Petitioner's
rights were sufficiently "impaired" to meet eveD this restrictive standard.
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Service and local police-turning Section 230's Title literally on
its head-offering protection for refusing to block and refusing
to screen the incendiary Ken Z postings.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.
THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED
BECAUSE THE ERROR OF THE COURT
BELOW ADVERSELY IMPACTS THE
PUBLIC INTEREST AND SAFETY AND TIDS
CASE PRESENTS THE COURT THE FIRST
OPPORTUNITY TO INTERPRET THE
LIMITS OF THE IMMUNITY GRANTED ON
LINE SERVICE PROVIDERS BY THE CDA.
The Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted because of the major distinctive features of this
case: (1) it involves a proprietary private member-only online service not the Internet; (2) it involves civil not criminal
liability; (3) it involves federal law overriding state tort law,
an area traditionally left to the states, expressly recognized by
§ 230(d)(3); (4) it is the first case interpreting section 230(c)
and the interplay between sections 230(c) and 230(d), (5) it is
of great public importance and interest, and (6) the
consequence of the decision below is to encourage criminal
conduct.

(l) Despite repeated references to the Internet in both
decisions below, this case involves a very different type of
'Tinteractive computer service": to go online one has to become
a member; provide name address, phone number, and credit
card number' agree to a specified code of online conduct
("Terms of Service" and "Rules of the Road"), the violation of
which subject the member to tennination etc. These
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significant differences impact directly on the public policy
question of imposing distributor liability on an OSP such as
AOL.

available to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1)" (§ 230(c)(2)(B).

(2) This Court has previously reviewed the criminal
provisions of the CDA (47 U.S.c. § 223) in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), which focused
on the Internet. The Court affirmed the lower court's
conclusion that prOVlSlons banning "indecent" communications violated the First Amendment, but left the
prohibitions relating to obscene communications intact. 117
S.Ct. at 2350. The Court has not yet considered the CDA's
impact on civil tort liability, an area of growing public impact
and concern.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals' determination that
instead "of SUbjecting themselves to possible lawsuits, service
providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation"
(129 F.3d at 333), ignores the immunity provided even
distributors for "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access or availability of material" under §
230( c)(2)(A).

(3) The District Court preempted a traditional area of
state interest, tort law, because it conflicted with a supposed
extension of the language of § 230(c) to a distributor (which
is, of course, not in the section itself) and the purpose
discerned in the CDA itself by the Court. Zeran, 958 F.Supp.
at 1133-335.
Eschewing the traditional preemption analysis used
below, the Court of Appeals opinion found a purpose of the
CDA was to "eliminate the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose
to freedom of speech", which necessitated the extension of
publisher immunity to distributors. Of course nothing in §
230(c) refers to any such concern, nor does any of extent
legislative history. In point of fact, the titles to sections 230
and 230(c) reflect Congressional concern to the contrary as
does the CDA-Iimitations on speech by encouraging a
provider of an interactive computer service to "restrict access
to or the availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene . . . harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected" (§ 230(c)(2)(A), emphasis
supplied) and protecting "any action taken to enable or make

(4) No case involving the CDA has yet reached this
stage and this Petition presents the Court with an opportunity
to determine these novel issues of public significance.
(5) This case has already been the subject of a number
of commentaries. e.g. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon
Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 Albany L.Rev.
147 (1997), (criticizing the District Court decision)12; BaIlon,
Defamation and Preemption Under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Why The Fourth Circuit's Ruling in Zeran v.
America Otlline, Inc. is Wrong, (in press) Journal of Internet
Law March 1998. 13
12 The author asserts that imposing liability on the provider is likely the
only way to protect a defamed plaintiff, observing:

This is particularly applicable to Zeran. AOL after all
controlled its own servers, and Zeran had no ability to
remove the defamatory messages himself. Furthermore,
since neither Zeran nor AOL could identify the person who
posted the messages, Zeran could neither motivate that
person to remove them nor sue him for damages. Id. at 173.
13 As the title suggests, the author is highly critical of both the decisions
below. This article will also be contained in the author's treatise, The Law
of/he Internet (Glasser Legal Works 1998).
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Additionally, it raises the specter of a totally innocent
individual being victimized because of corporate policies
(recruiting new members with trial memberships without
verifying their identity refusing to notify its members that the
posting is bogus not adopting available blocking technology
to stop repeated postings, etc.) deprived of any remedy against
the party that originally posted (anonymously) and stripped of
any relief against the OSP responsible for the original posting
(by not verifying identity and letting the cuJprit online), for
continuing injuries (by not alerting its members) and for
subsequent po stings (by not blocking them). The term
"Kafkaesque" was made for this case. With total impunity for
its acts 14 , the public, especially AOL non-members unable to
defend themselves, are at the mercy of an AOL with no
interest in carrying out the true purposes of § 230.
(6) Because AOL's corporate policy allows individuals
to go online with assurance of escaping detection lS
interpreting sections 230(c) and (d)(3) to immunize AOL for
this negligent act (intentionally undertaken) contradicts a
specific Congressional purpose expressed in sections
230(b)(5) and (d)(l )-indeed, it encourages anonymous
computer crime, crime committed in such a way as to incite
many others (understandably incensed at the purveyor of the
"naughty" t-shirts) to violate 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(l)(C) by
making threatening, harassing phone calls.

14 AOL contended at the District Court that AOL would be immune
from liability even if "AOL knew of the defamatory nature of the material
and made a decision not to remove it from the network based upon a
malicious desire to cause harm to the party defamed." Zeran, 958 F.Supp.
at 1133 n. 20.

15 The worst fate for such a criminal is to have the bogus membership
canceled. Of course, as happened here, a new trial membership with yet a
new identity can be established within minutes and the crime spree
resumed.
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The Court should grant certiorari to review these
matters of great importance and resolve these issues of first
impression concerning § 230 of the CDA.

II.
THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS'
APPLICATION
OF
THE
CDA
TO
RETROACTIVELY
BAR
PETITIONER'S
STATE TORT CLAIM CONFLICTS WITH THE
COURT'S
RECENT
RETROACTIVITY
JURISPRUDENCE.

The Court should grant certiorari to extend its recent
decisions in Landgraf and Hughes Aircraft to address the
rights of tort plaintiffs such as Petitioner to recover for
completed acts of negligence committed before the effective
date of legislation like the CDA, especially where the
petitioner clearly manifested reliance upon the law existing at
the time of the completed events which gave rise to liability
and took affirmative steps to pursue his available remedies
and the CDA contains no clear intention to apply
retroactively.
There can be no doubt that Petitioner repeatedly
manifested his reliance upon settled case law long before the
adoption of the CDA and applying § 230(c) retroactively
would render it extremely unfair to dismiss plaintiffs claims. [6
16

The Circuit Court's opinion is clearly incorrect when the court stated:
Furthermore, Zeran cannot point to any action he took in
reliance on the law prior to prior to § 230's enactment. 129
F.3d at 335.

All of this material was presented to the District Court to rebut an
argument by AOL that Petitioner's crafty lawyers had concocted a new
negligence theory to avoid the CDA and that such the court should reject
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These include:
1. plaintiff took immediate action to notify AOL of the
incendiary posting and followed it up with many
communications to AOL to remove the posting and avoid
others from being posted (Complaint ~~ 7, 12, 13, 14, 24, 25,
28, and 33);
2. AOL failed to take prompt action on plaintiffs
request to remove the posting, refused to post a retraction or
notice that the posting was false, and failed to take steps to
preclude repostings (Complaint, ~~ 42-45);
3. Because of the negligent manner in which AOL
solicits its new members, AOL (and the FBI and Secret
Service too) was, and remains to this day, unable to identify
the AOL member who joined using bogus information that
triggered hundreds of criminal, harassing phone calls; the
person(s) who posted the Ken Z po stings changed his bogus
information at least twice and used new (deceptively similar)
screen names. (see Exs. 3, 4 and 5 and Ex. 6, Answer to
Interrogatory 3, # 15, all attached to Petitioner's Brief in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings).
4. Plaintiffs counsel asserted from the earliest time
that AOL was liable as a distributor and not a publisher,
establishing plaintiffs reliance on the law as it undeniably
existed prior to the adoption of the CDA. (Exs. D and E to
Kayser Aff. attached to Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings);
5. Before the effective date of the CDA, plaintiff
instituted an action for damages arising from an Oklahoma
City radio broadcast which was a direct and foreseeable result
such attempts by "creative litigants".
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of AOL's negligence; the basic allegations in the Complaint
against Diamond Broadcasting, Inc. are identical to those in
the Complaint against AOL. (see footnote 1, supra).
6. All of the acts which give rise to AOL's tort liability
occurred (were completed) long before the adoption of the
CDA.
The Court should determine that the "potential
unfairness of retroactive application" under Landgraf and
Hughes Aircraft precludes the elimination of Petitioner's sole
remedy by the Court of Appeal's interpretation of retroactivity
principles.
CONCLUSION

This case presents novel questions of exceptional
importance for the Court and this country and its future. Only
by addressing these questions can the rights of its citizens and
the Petitioner be vindicated. The Court faces a "Y" in the road
on the information superhighway. The choices made by the
Court will lead us in one direction or the other. Such a
weighty choice deserves the full consideration by the Court.
The writ should be granted.
DATED: March 9, 1998
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES A. IKARD
211 N. Robinson, Suite 600
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
(405) 239-7046
Counsel of Record
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied settled
rules of statutory construction in detennining that
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which commands that "[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider," barred
Petitioner's cause of action, which sought to hold Respondent America Online, Inc., a provider of an interactive
computer service, liable for allegedly defamatory messages provided by a third party.

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied settled law
concerning the temporal reach of federal statutes in
concluding that 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3), which provides in
relevant part that "[n]o cause of action may be brought and
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law
that is inconsistent with this section," required application
of 47 V.S .c. § 230(c)(1) to Petitioner's cause of action,
which Petitioner did not file until after the statute was
enacted and became effective.

Page
Sup. Ct. R. lO(a). .. .. .. ... . .. . .. .... . . . . . . . .. . . . 8

Respondent America Online, Inc ("AOL"), defendant
below, respectfully opposes the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
for the reasons set forth herein.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) .. .. .. .... . .. . . . . .. .. . ...... . . 4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

MISCELLANEOUS
W . Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law
o/Torts(5thed.1984) .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. ... 10

Restatement (Second) o/Torts (1977) . . . . . . . . . . .. 10,11

The statute at issue in this case is section 509 of the
Telecommunications Act of1996, now codified at 47 US.C.A.
§ 230 (West Supp. 1997) ("Section 230"). Because Petitioner
failed to set out the statute in full in his Petition, the entire text
of the statute is reprinted in the Appendix to this Opposition.
COUNTERSTATEMENT

Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, Slander, and
Related Problems (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997) .. . . . . 18

1. America Online, Inc. AOL operates an interactive
computer service over which millions of subscribers disseminate and receive information by means of computer modem
connections to AOL's computer network. Pet. App. A-3.
Much of the information transmitted over AOL' s service
originates with AOL subscribers, who may transmit information over AOL's service through a variety of methods, including electronic mail (private electronic communications addressed to specific recipients) and message boards (online areas
where subscribers may post messages that are then generally
available for review by other subscribers). Id

2. The Complaint. According to the Complaint,!I on
April 25, 1995, an unidentified person using the screen name

Because the courts below adjudicated this case on the basis
of AOL's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the allegations
in the complaint were accepted as true. By reciting Zeran's
allegations, AOL does not concede their truth.

!!

Vlll

3

2

"Ken ZZ03"11 posted on an AOL message board a message
advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts" with offensive
slogans referring to the bombing of the federal building in
Oklahoma City. Id. The message indicated that anyone
interested in the t-shirts should contact "Ken" and listed a
phone number that belonged to Zeran's business, which he
operated out of his home. Id. Zeran allegedly began receiving
derogatory and threatening phone calls as a result of the posted
message. Id. After Zeran learned of the message from the
phone calls, he allegedly informed AOL that the posting was a
hoax. and asked that it be removed. Id at A-3 to A-4.
Shortly after being contacted by Zeran, AOL deleted the
posted message. Id at A-24. But over the next several days,
an unidentified person using two slightly different screen
names posted three similar messages. Id. at A-24 to A-25.
During this period, Zeran allegedly telephoned AOL on a
number of occasions to request removal of the messages. Id.
He allegedly continued to receive unwanted calls about the
messages. Id.
On May 1, 1995, someone sent a copy of one of the posted
messages to an announcer for radio station KRXO in Oklahoma City. Id at A-4. That day, KRXO allegedly aired a

A "screen name" is a unique set of characters (letters or
numbers) that identifies a person or entity that originates a
mes~age or posting transmitted via an interactive computer
servIce or the Internet. AOL permits each of its subscribers to
have as many as five different screen names of no more than
ten characters each. It is commonplace for an AOL
subscriber's screen name(s) to be different from his or her real
name.

7:/

broadcast in which the announcer read out parts of the message, gave Zeran's business phone number over the air,' and
encouraged listeners to call the number. Id. As a result of the
broadcast, Zeran allegedly received death threats and other
calls with violent language from Oklahoma City. Id
On January 4, 1996, Zeran filed suit in federal district
court in Oklahoma against the owner of radio station KRXO.
Id at A-5. In that suit, he alleged that the station's broadcast in
which the announcer read aloud portions of one of the posted
messages constituted defamation, false light invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
district court in that case recently granted summary judgment
in favor of KRXO's owner on each count of Zeran's
complaint.¥
On April 23, 1996, several months after suing KRXO's
owner and two months after enactment of 47 U.S.C. § 230,
Zeran filed this separate action against AOL in the same
Oklahoma district court. Id.!! This suit sought recovery for
alleged reputational injury and emotional distress caused by the
allegedly defamatory messages. Zeran alleged that, upon
notice that the first of the messages was a hoax., AOL had a
duty to take reasonable care not only to remove that message,
but also to employ some electronic screening mechanism to

Zeran v. DiamondBroad. Inc., No. CN-96-0008-T (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 29, 1997), appeal docketed, Nos. 98-6092,98-6094

'J!

(10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1998).

.

Zeran's suit against AOL was subsequently transferred to
the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Pet. App. A-5 .

!!
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prevent the posting of any subsequent messages containing
Zeran's first name or telephone number. Id at A-24, A-26.

effective," regardless of when the underlying events occurred.
Id. at A-16.

After filing its Answer, AOL moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) on the ground that
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(I), which prohibits treating interactive
service providers such as AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of
third-party content, barred Zeran's action. Id at A-26.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3. The Decisions Below. On March 21, 1997, the
District Court granted AOL' s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Id at A-21 to A-46. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at A-I to
A-IS. The Court of Appeals held that Section 230(c)(I)
precluded suits that "would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service."
Id. at A-6 to A-16. The court specifically rejected Zeran's
claim that Section 230(c)(I) did not apply to "distributors" of
information, holding that under the general common-law
meaning of "publisher," distributor liability is "merely a subset,
or a species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also
foreclosed by § 230." Id at A-I0.

The courts below also rebuffed Zeran's argument that
applying Section 230 to his suit would have an impermissible
retroactive effect. Id at A-16 to A-IS. Applying this Court's
familiar Landgraf test, ~ the Court of Appeals found that
Section 230's command that "[n]o cause of action may be
brought" under inconsistent state law "applies by its plain
terms to complaints brought after [Section 230] became

Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).

None of the reasons that this Court typically considers as
favoring the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction is present
here, and there are multiple reasons that affirmatively militate
against granting the Petition. First and foremost, rather than
being in conflict with any other decision, the decision below is
the first (and so far only) decision by any appellate court
construing 47 U.S.C. § 230, and the Court of Appeals reached
the same result as all of the reported decisions to date by the
few trial courts that have construed the relevant provisions of
this statute.
Moreover, while this case concerns the relatively new
medium of interactive computer services, the Petition itself
presents no legal issue of national importance that would
warrant the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction in the absence of
a conflict with other decisions. The Petition presents nothing
more than ordinary issues of statutory construction of the sort
that the courts of appeals resolve every day. And these issues
are narrow in scope, as illustrated by the fact that, in the more
than two years since the statute was enacted, there have been
only three other cases in which trial courts have construed
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(I), and only one other case in which a trial
court has determined the statute's temporal reach.
Nor does anything about the nature of the decision below
warrant further review by this Court. The Court of Appeals
faithfully adhered to well-settled principles of statutory
construction and reached a decision that accords fully not only
with the plain language of the statute, but also with Congress's
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policy objectives as explicitly stated in the statute's "[f]indings" and "[p]olicy" preamble. Petitioner's disagreement with
the decision below is, at bottom, a disagreement with the basic
policy choice that Congress expressed in the statute. That is
not a proper basis for granting further review of the decision.

The court below ruled that this provision bars the imposition of
liability on AOL for injury allegedly caused by a third party's
defamatory or otherwise tortious messages. Specifically, it
held that making AOL liable would impermissibly treat AOL
(which Petitioner concedes is a "provider of an interactive
computer service," Pet. App. A-6 n.1S) as the "publisher or
speaker" of the allegedly tortious messages (which Petitioner
concedes are "information provided by another information
content provider," id).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING THAT
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) BARRED PETITIONER'S
CLAIM DOES NOT MERIT FURTHER REVIEW.

Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 in order to eliminate
uncertainties in the law governing whether providers of
interactive computer services, such as AOL, could be liable for
harms resulting from the dissemination of tortious content that
other persons or entities create and transmit using such
services.~ In Section 230(c)(I), Congress provided:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider. (emphasis added)
Section 230 is part of the Communications Decency Act
("CDA"), two provisions of which this Court struck down on
First Amendment grounds last Term. Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) and most of
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) unconstitutional). The invalidation of these
other CDA sections did not affect Section 230. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 60S ("If any provision of this [Act] .. . is held invalid, the
remainder of the [Act] .. . shall not be affected thereby.");
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (holding that portion of Section
223 not implicated by First Amendment ruling remains intact).

§!

The Court of Appeals' construction of the term "publisher
or speaker" as used in Section 230(c)(I) was based on wellestablished principles of statutory interpretation and is fully
consistent with the decision of every other court that has
construed the term. This holding does not merit further review
by this Court.

A. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With the
Ruling of Any Other Court.
As even Petitioner acknowledges, the Court of Appeals'
decision raises no conflict with any decision in any court. The
decision below was the first-and thus far only-appellate
decision involving the interpretation of Section 230. In
Petitioner's words, this "is the first case interpreting section
230(c) and the interplay between sections 230(c) and 230(d),"
and accordingly, "[n]o case involving [Section 230] has yet
reached this stage." Pet. at 17, 19. Thus, by definition, the
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decision raises no conflict with another decision of a federal
court of appeals or state court oflast resort. Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).11

1032, 1032 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1997) (dismissing tort
claims on the basis of Section 230(c)(l».!i Thus, far from
creating a conflict that might require this Court's attention, the
decision below simply exemplifies the unanimity of the lower
courts in their interpretation of Section 230(c)(1).

The decision below does not even conflict with any
decision in the federal or state trial courts. In fact, we are
aware of only three other decisions concerning the interpretation of Section 230(c)(I), all of which reached the same
conclusion as the courts below in this case. See Blumenthal v.
Drudge, No. CIV. A 97-1968 PLF, 1998 WL 195979, at **3-5
(D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1998) (Section 230(c)(I) "effectively
immunize[ s] providers of interactive computer services from
civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by
them but created by others"); Doe v. America Online, Inc., No.
CIV. CL 97-631 AE, 1997 WL 374223, at **2-3 (FI. Cir. Ct.
June 26, 1997) ("Making AOL liable for [a third-party' s] chat
room communications would treat AOL as the 'publisher or
speaker' of those communications" in violation of Section
230(c)(I).); Aquino v. Electriciti Inc., 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA)

B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Was a Correct
and Straightforward Application of Settled Principles of Statutory Interpretation.
The sole legal issue Petitioner raises with respect to the
operation of Section 230(c)(I) is the meaning of the term
"publisher or speaker." The Court of Appeals, relying on
settled principles of statutory construction, determined that
holding AOL liable for third-party content would treat it as the
"publisher" of that content in contravention of Section
230(c)(I). Petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals

The only other case of which we are aware in which a
court has construed any of Section 230's operative provisions
is Mainstream Loudoun v. Loudoun County Library, No. CIV.
A. 97-2049-A, 1998 WL 164330 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 1998). In
that case, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, the same court that issued the original
decision in this case, held that another part of Section
230-namely 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)-does not bar a suit
against a public library challenging on constitutional grounds
the library's content-based restrictions on Internet access. The
court in that case appropriately looked to the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case for guidance concerning the
overarching purposes of Section 230. The district court
decision in Mainstream Loudoun, interpreting a different
provision of Section 230, does not conflict with the decision of
the Court of Appeals below.

!!

Ironically, Petitioner repeatedly touts the absence of other
appellate decisions construing Section 230 as if that were a
reason to grant the Petition. See, e.g., Pet. at 17 ("This case
presents the Court the first opportunity to interpret the limits of
the immunity granted online service providers." (emphasis
added»; id at 21 ("The Court should grant certiorari to ...
resolve these issues ofJirst impression concerning § 230 of the
CDA" (emphasis added». This fundamentally misapprehends
this Court's approach to certiorari review, which generally
disfavors review of issues for which there has been little or no
fermentation in the lower courts. See, e.g., McCray v. New
York, 461 U.S. 961,963 (1983) (Stevens, 1.) (concluding that,
particularly given the absence of conflict, certiorari should be
denied to allow "further study" of the issue in lower courts).
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committed an error on this point does not warrant further
reVIew.

party" and "fault amounting at least to negligence on the part
of the publisher" (emphasis added)).

Because Section 230 does not contain an explicit definition
of the tenn "publisher," the court below properly turned to the
common law to detennine its meaning. See, e.g., Gilbert v.
United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) ("[I]n the absence of
anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress
use[s a] word in [a] statute in its common-law sense."). As the
Court of Appeals explained, under the common law, "both the
negligent communication of a defamatory statement and the
failure to remove such a statement when first communicated by
another party--each alleged by Zeran here under a negligence
label-constitute publication." Pet. App. A-I0 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(b) (1977)); see also Restatement
§ 577 ("One who intentionally and unreasonably Jails to
remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on
land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject
to liability for its continued publication." (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, in the context of torts such as defamation,
distributors are merely a type of publisher: "Those who are in
the business of making their facilities available to disseminate
the writings composed, the speeches made, and the infonnation
gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to
such an extent in making the ... infonnation available to others
as to be regarded as publishers." W. Page Keeton et aI.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law oj Torts 803 (5th ed. 1984).
Indeed, basic hornbook law provides that an entity may be
liable for harm caused by a defamatory statement if and only if
the entity "published" the statement. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 558 (1977) (essential elements of any defamation
action include both "an unprivileged publication to a third

In the face of this unequivocal common law background,
Petitioner essentially concedes that holding a distributor such
as AOL liable for third-party content would treat it as a
"publisher" under the common law usage of the term. See Pet.
at 12. He claims, however, that Congress intended to implement a "narrow definition" of the term that did not include
distributors, a definition that he alleges is embodied in two
earlier trial court decisions, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135 (SD.N.Y. 1991) and Stratton-Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WI.. 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995). Pet. at 12. The court below considered and rejected
this argument, correctly concluding that neither StrattonOakmont nor Cubby supports the proposition that holding a
distributor liable for disseminating defamatory content would
not treat the distributor as the "publisher" of that content.2'
As the Court of Appeals observed, although both StrattonOakmont and Cubby recognized a legal distinction between
publishers and distributors, "this distinction signifies only that
different standards of liability may be applied within the larger

2'
The courts in both Blumenthal and Doe expressly considered and rejected the very same argument that Petitioner
raises here. See Blumenthal, 1998 WL 195979, at *7 ("Any
attempt to distinguish between 'publisher' liability and noticebased ' distributor' liability and to argue that Section 230 was
only intended to immunize the former would be unavailing.");
Doe, 1997 WL 374223, at *3 ("[T]o hold AOL liable for
negligently 'distributing' [third-party content] .. . would treat
AOL as the 'publisher or speaker' of those statements.").
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publisher category; depending on the specific type of publisher
concerned." Pet. App. A-II. In particular, those decisions
merely identified the well-established constitutional and
common law principle that the First Amendment provides a
"deeply rooted" protection for distributors such as interactive
service providers and that, as a result, such a provider may be
held liable as the publisher of defamatory third-party content
only if it "knew or should have known" of the defamation.
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139-41 (citing Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959)); Stratton-Oakmont, 1995 WL
323710, at *3. But while those decisions describe the different
standards of liability for publishers and distributors, they "do
not ... suggest that distributors are not also a type of publisher
for purposes of defamation law." Pet. App. at A-II to A-12.

47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)-(b). These introductory sections-which
Petitioner almost completely ignores-are the type of clear and
reliable evidence of Congress' purposes and goals on which
this Court routinely relies.!QI The preamble announces, inter
alia, congressional findings that "interactive computer services
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity" and that these services have "flourished,
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(3)-(4) (emphasis added).
The preamble further declares that it is "the policy of the
United States ... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation." Id § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added). Viewed in the context
of the whole of Section 230, these declarations reflect Congress's view that a legal regime under which interactive
computer service providers could face tort liability for dissemination of content produced by others inevitably would hurt the
development of an emerging communications medium that
obviously holds great promise.

Having applied well-established principles of statutory
interpretation to determine that holding AOL liable would treat
it as a "publisher" in contravention of Section 230(c)(I), the
Court of Appeals confirmed its conclusion by analyzing
whether such a meaning was consistent with and would further
the purposes of Section 230. Pet. App. at A-12 to A-14. This
approach, far from being a "manifest[] depart[ure] from any
accepted rule of judicial construction and [an] inva[ sion of] the
province of the legislature," Pet. at 13, was again the method
required by accepted principles of statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In
determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as
a whole and to its object and policy.").
Determining the purposes of Section 230 was a straightforward task: Congress explicitly stated its goals in the "Findings"
and "Policy" statement set out in the preamble of the statute.

At the same time, Section 230's preamble reflects that
Congress recognized the need to deter and punish truly harmful
online speech and chose to do so by strengthening enforcement
of federal criminal laws against the actual wrongdoers who
originate such speech. The preamble declares that it is the

See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 US. 160, 177 (1991);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 n.12 (1979); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 US. 672, 678 (1971); American Trucking
Ass'ns. v. United States, 364 US. 1,6 (1960).

.ill'
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"policy of the United States ... to ensure vigorous enforcement
of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer."
Id. § 230(b)(5). Thus, Congress made the policy decision to
deter tortious online speech not by punishing the intermediary-as Petitioner's suit would do-but by strengthening the
enforcement of legal remedies against the culpable source of
the unlawful content.

Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals recognized, noticebased liability would have a chilling effect on speech over
interactive services, contrary to Congress' intent that these
services continue to flourish as "a forum for a true diversity of
political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity." 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(a)(4). Under Petitioner's theory, once a service provider
received notice of a possibly tortious message, it would face
potential liability and have to make a "careful yet rapid
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted
information, a legal judgment concerning the information's
defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision
whether to risk liability by allowing the continued publication
of that information." Pet. App. A-13. Even assuming that
were practical given the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services, such a rule would result in the suppression of speech: "Because service providers would be subject
to liability only for the publication of information, and not for
its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to
remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were
defamatory or not." Id Such results would frustrate Congress'
intent.

Having recited these congressional purposes, the court
below correctly found that the rule of law advocated by
Petitioner-that an interactive computer service should be
liable for injury caused by a series offalse third-party messages
once it is notified that one of its millions of users has posted
one such message--would undermine Congress' goals. Such
a rule would run directly counter to the express statutory policy
that such services be "unfettered by Federal or State regulation." 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). Moreover, as the Court of
Appeals accurately discerned, Pet. App. A-I3 to A-I4, it would
also have the perverse effect of undermining the statute's clear
objective to remove disincentives for interactive computer
services voluntarily to engage in self-regulatory activities
designed to restrict the availability of material that they
consider to be objectionable. As the Court of Appeals explained, under the rule advocated by Petitioner, "[a]ny efforts
by a service provider to investigate and screen material posted
on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a stronger
basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further
possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any
attempts at self-regulation." Pet. App. A-13 to A-I4.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT
47 U.S.C. § 230 APPLIES TO THIS CASE EVEN
THOUGH THE EVENTS ALLEGED IN THE
COMPLAINT PRE-DATE ITS ENACTMENT DOES
NOT MERIT FURTHER REVIEW.
Petitioner also challenges the Court of Appeals' application of this Court's Landgraf test for determining whether
Section 230 governs this case, which, though it involves events
pre-dating the enactment of Section 230, was filed after the
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date of enactment. The court below held that Section 230
applies in these circumstances based on the plain meaning of
the second sentence of Section 230(d)(3), which provides:

case, that court also ruled that the plain language of Section
230(d)(3) required applying the statute to all cases brought
after its enactment, regardless of when the underlying events
occurred. See id at *4. Accordingly, this case presents no
conflict for this Court to resolve.

No cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.
The Court of Appeals' decision on this point does not
merit further review for at least three reasons. First, this ruling
represents the first and (so far) only appellate decision concerning this issue and is identical to the trial court ruling in the only
other case in which this issue has been decided. Second, the
decision raises no issue of national importance, particularly
given that in the more than two years Section 230 has been law,
this case is one of only two of which we are aware that have
raised any issue concerning the temporal reach of Section 230.
Third, the court below, following this Court's precedents,
applied the undisputedly appropriate legal framework to reach
the correct result.

A. The Decision Below Is Not in Conflict with the
Decision of Any Other Court.
As with the Court of Appeals' construction of Section

230(c)(1), its decision concerning the temporal reach of
Section 230 creates no conflict with the decision of any other
court. Aside from the present case, the issue has not been
decided in any federal court of appeals or state court of last
resort. Indeed, the only other decision to date concerning
Section 230' s temporal reach was a decision last year by a state
trial-level court, Doe v. America Online, Inc., No. CIV. CL 97631 AE, 1997 WL 374223 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 26,1997). Citing
the federal district court's carefully-reasoned decision in this

B. Section 230's Temporal Reach Is Not an Issue of
National Importance.
The question of whether Section 230 controls cases filed
after the statute was enacted and became effective but involving some events that predate enactment is particularly unworthy of further review because, even assuming arguendo that the
decision were wrong, its implications are extremely narrow.
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the Court of
Appeals' ruling on this issue will be significant to no one other
than the Petitioner himself and, at most, a small handful of
other current or prospective plaintiffs. See generally Rice v.
Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 79 & n.2 (1955) (certiorari
is inappropriate where "the question [is] of importance merely
to the litigants and [does] not present an issue of immediate
public significance").
As already noted, since Section 230 was enacted and
became effective on February 8, 1996, this case and Doe v.
America Online, which also involved only one plaintiff, are the
only cases of which we are aware in which any court has
considered whether Section 230 applies to all cases filed after
it was enacted, regardless of when the events at issue took
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place.!Y We are not aware of any other case that has been filed
against AOL or any other interactive computer service in which
this issue has arisen or may arise.

outside the limited context of cases in which Section 230 is
raised as a defense. As discussed in greater detail in the next
section, the decision below broke no new ground, but rather
applied well-settled retroactivity jurisprudence to the particular
language of 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). Because the Court of
Appeals' analysis was primarily based on the statute's plain
language, its ruling will have little or no relevance to cases
involving other statutes.

Moreover, given that Section 230 has been law for more
than two years, few, if any, additional cases are likely to be
filed that will implicate the applicability of Section 230 to preenactment events. Indeed, even assuming that other possible
plaintiffs have a potential claim implicating application of
Section 230 and arising out of facts that predate its enactment,
their claims are likely to be barred on other threshold grounds
such as statutes of limitations, which are often two years or less
for torts such as defamation.!Y
Finally, the decision below concerning the temporal reach
of Section 230 is unlikely to have any significant ramification

!Y One other case now pending in a state court may present
the related, but distinct, question of whether Section 230
controls a case that was already pending when the statute was
enacted. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 21886/94 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 97-07342 (N.Y.
App. Div. Jan. 29, 1998). In that case, the New York trial court
denied defendant Prodigy's motion for summary judgment on
solely State procedural grounds, without even construing any
part of Section 230, much less determining its temporal reach.

Id
!Y For example, all but six states (Arkansas, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont)
have a statute of limitations period for defamation actions that
is two years or less. See Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron,
Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 835 (2d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 1997).

Given the extremely circumscribed impact of the decision
below, this case does not present any important question of
federal law and does not warrant further review by this Court.

C.

The Decision Below, Rather Than Conflicting
With This Court's Retroactivity Jurisprudence,
Simply Involved a Straightforward Application of
the Analytical Framework Articulated in This
Court's Prior Decisions.

Although Petitioner claims that the decision below
somehow conflicts with this Court's retroactivity decisions, the
Court of Appeals faithfully applied this Court's framework for
analyzing the temporal reach of federal statutes and correctly
concluded that, under that framework, Section 230 governs
Petitioner's claim. Moreover, Petitioner's entire retroactivity
attack on the opinion below concerns a single paragraph in the
decision that was not even necessary to the court's decision,
further obviating any need for further review of this case.
In both Landgraf and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States
ex reI Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997), this Court held that the
first step in a retroactivity analysis is "to determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach,"
in which case that prescription governs. Landgraf, 511 U. S. at
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280. Despite Petitioner's inexplicable assertion that AOL does
not rely on this step of the analysis, Pet. at 15 n.10, the Court
of Appeals properly concluded that "[t]his case can be resolved
at this first step." Pet. App. A-17. Petitioner's utter failure
even to address this step of the analysis is reason enough to
deny certiorari on the issue of Section 230's temporal reach.

tion in this litigation is in fact prospective." Id; see also
Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 88990 (2d Cir. 1995) (statute applied prospectively because it
"applied to conduct that occur[red] after the statute's enactment-plaintiff's filing of the complaint-not the defendant's
allegedly unlawful acts. "); St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Compensation Comm 'n, 65 F.3d 43,46 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).

Section 230(d)(3) expressly provides that "[n]o cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under
any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."
47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). This clear language led the Court of
Appeals to hold that "Section 230 applies by its plain terms to
complaints brought after the CDA became effective," even if
the events at issue occurred before the statute's enactment. Pet.
App. A-16. Congress could not have expressed its intent more
clearly: from the date of Section 230's enactment (February 8,
1996), no action may be filed and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law inconsistent with Section 230,
regardless of when the underlying events occurred. Congress'
"use of . . . absolute language" left no room for courts to
determine whether the statute should apply only to some cases
filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059,
2064 n.4 (1997). Thus, because Petitioner's suit was filed after
enactment of Section 230, a straightforward interpretation of
Section 230(d)(3) requires the application of Section 230 to
this case.
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals noted, "it is doubtful that
a retroactivity issue is even presented here." Pet. App. A-16.
Section 230(d)(3) addresses only conduct related to litigation-the bringing of a lawsuit and the imposition of liability.
Because Petitioner did not file his complaint until after Section
230 was enacted and became effective, "the statute's applica-

Although the Court of Appeals recognized that its conclusion that Congress had clearly expressed its intent that Section
230 apply to all suits brought after its enactment resolved
Petitioner's retroactivity claim, it briefly noted that Petitioner's
argument would in any case also fail under the second prong of
the Landgraf test. Pet. App. A-18. Petitioner's entire argument on retroactivity is directed to this brief discussion by the
Court of Appeals. See Pet. at 14-17, 21-23. But, given the
Court of Appeals' ruling as to the clear intent of the statute, its
examination of the second prong of the Landgraf test was not
even necessary for its decision. Thus, even if this Court
believed that the court below had erred in its application of the
second step of the Landgraf framework, this case would not
present a suitable vehicle for review of that issue.
In any case, the Court of Appeals was correct when it
determined that, even in the absence of clear Congressional
intent, Section 230 would apply to this case because doing so
would not have an impermissible retroactive effect. Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 280. A law has retroactive effect only when its
application to pre-enactment events would be unfair because a
party has relied upon the pre-existing law in planning his or her
conduct. . As the Landgraf Court explained, "[e]lementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have
an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their
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conduct accordingly." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. In other
words" the presumption against retroactivity is designed to
avoid the unfairness of changing the legal rules when a person
has engaged in conduct with an expectation of the probable
legal consequences.

consequences of his own past actions, but an alleged unfairness
of not having a claim against AOL.

As the Court of Appeals concluded, however, "Zeran
cannot point to any action he took in reliance on the law prior
to § 230's enactment." Pet. App. A-IS. Clearly, his alleged
actions in responding to the messages on AOL's system by
complaining to AOL were not premised in any way on existing
legal rules. Indeed, he cannot even claim that he filed suit
against AOL in reliance on pre-Section 230 law because the
statute was enacted before he brought suit. The only "reliance
interest" Petitioner claims-or can claim-is that he relied on
his understanding of that law as the basis for this suit. llI The
unfairness to which Petitioner points is not any change in the

Petitioner's list of the six ways he "repeatedly manifested
his reliance upon settled case law" only demonstrates his lack
of any cognizable reliance. Pet. at 21-23. The second item on
his list concerns actions taken by AOL, not Petitioner. The
third and sixth are merely factual statements that the original
party who posted the messages remains unidentified and that
the events at issue occurred prior to enactment of Section 230.
Nothing in the Complaint indicates that Petitioner's
notification of AOL when he first learned of the postings was
based in any way on reliance on any rule of law. The
remaining two items on Petitioner's list concern litigation
decisions (such as bringing suit) that would apply in any case
raising retroactivity issues and therefore cannot be the type of
conduct that the presumption against retroactivity protects.

ill

But that is not the type of "reliance" or "unfairness" the
presumption against retroactivity protects. After all, courts
often apply statutes to suits involving pre-enactment events
even though the effect is to eliminate the claim upon which the
plaintiff was relying to seek redress for alleged wrongs. As
Justice Scalia observed in Landgraf, the general rule is that a
statute eliminating jurisdiction is applied to cases involving
pre-enactment events, even though doing so "can deny a
litigant a forum for his claim entirely." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at
292-93 (Scalia, 1., concurring).
Thus, the decision below concerning whether 'Section 230
applied to this case raises no significant legal issue worthy of
review. The Court of Appeals unquestionably applied the
appropriate legal test and reached the correct result.
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CONCLUSION
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE VRADENBURG,
RANDALL 1. BOE
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141 Congo Rec. H 8460, 8471. (August 5, 1995) .
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BaIlon, Defamation and Preemption Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Why The Fourth
Circuit's Ruling in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. is Wrong,
Journal oflnternet Law, March 1998 6-13. . . . .
5
Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Act,
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Petitioner Kenneth M. Zeran ("ZERAN") respectfully
submits his reply to the Opposition of America Online, Inc.
("AOL") to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by
ZERAN. ("AOL Opp."). Primarily, AOL argues that this
case is not worthy of review by the Court because of the very
nature of its precedent-setting, landmark status (AOL Opp.
7-9) and because the retroactive application of § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230, "CDA") is
not of national importance. (AOL Opp.l7-19). Additionally,
AOL asserts at length that the court below correctly decided
the case. (AOL Opp. 9-17, 19-23).

I. This Case is Worthy of Certiorari
1

Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect ofSection
230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon
Liability for Defamation on the Internet
61 Albany L.Rev. 147 (1997) ............ . .. .

4

Stern, Gressman, Shapiro and Geller,
Supreme Court Practice §§ 4.11- 4.17 (7th ed. 1993)

1

Since the exercise of the Court's certiorari is
admittedly not subject to a mechanical fonnula and involves
l
an often complex and variable set of recognized factors ,
ZERAN submits that, when considered on the whole and
contrary to AOL's opposition, this case is appropriate for the
Court's review by certiorari. These factors include:

A. The Effects of the CDA on Petitioner's
Claims
1. The Courts Below Misconstrued the CDA
While the Court does not routinely grant certiorari
2
solely because the courts below committed error , AOL
asserts as a ground for denial of certiorari that the decisions
below were correct.
I These factors are outlined in Stem Gressman, Shapiro and Geller,
Supreme Court Practice §§ 4. 11-4.17 (7th ed. 1993) ("Supreme Court
Practice") and in publ ications of many of the Court's former and present
Justices. e.g. R ehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Act, 35 Mercer
L. Rev. 1015 (1984).

2

Supreme Court Practice, supra, § 4.17.

2

3

In advancing this argument, AOL has reproduced the
fundamental flaw in the decisions below- that because the
CDA does not include or define "distributor", congressional
intent must be deduced from reference to the common law of
defamation for § 230 (c) and from generalized statements of
congressional intent for § 230(d) (3). (AOL Opp. 10-13).

floor of Congress by lts authors 5 and the context of StrattonOakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Service Co., Inc., 1995 WL 323710
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 24, 1995) (publisher Hability imposed
v.
because of policing efforts) and Cubby, Inc.
CompuServe, Inc. el al., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D-N.Y.
1991) (OSP distributor must be placed on notice of the
contents of a publication before liability can be imposed
for electronic distribution of publication). Congress could
easily have cited Cubby, Inc. in the Conference Report and
the authors could have invoked Cubby, Inc. in debate as an
example of impediments to achieving the purposes of §
230(c) but did neither. The court should not have repealed
Cubby, Inc. when Congress chose not to do so.

First, this ignores the language of the CDA itself
which contains the terms "publisher or speaker" and
pointedly omits "distributor". The court should not have
supplied language (equating publisher and distributor)
Congress chose to omit.
Second, the opmlOn elevates the generalized
statements of congressional findings and intent (§§ 230(a)
and (b), (AOL Opp.12-13) over the specific title of § (c)
"Protection for 'Good Samaritan' Blocking and Screening
of Offensive Material". Congress adopted §§(c) (1) and (2)
for a specific purpose- to encourage action by an interactive
computer service3 to police its service without fear of
publisher or speaker liability. Instead, the opinion rewards
inaction in blocking and screening offensive material by a
distributor. In fact- each of AOL's arguments defeat the
undisputed purpose of230(c).
Third, the opinion pointedly ignores expressions of
specific congressional intent with regard to §§ 230(c) and
(d) (3), both in the legislative historl and comments on the

Finally, the court should not have extended § 230(d)
(3) to preempt state-based tort liability under the generalized
statements of congressional intent without more definitive
language, especially when Congress specifically chose to
allow the continuation of distributor liability. Maintenance

One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or
speakers of content that is not their own because they have
restricted access to objectionable material. (Emphasis added.)
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996)
In a floor colloquy between the House authors, Congressman Cox
stated:

5

As it relates to this appeal, AOL is a private, proprietary, member-only
on-line service provider ("OSP") where members provide name, address,
phone number, and credit card number and agree to a specified code of
online conduct ("Terms of Service" and "Rules of the Road"), the
violation of which subject the member to termination.

3

4

The Conference Report on Section 230 stated:

Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive for online
service providers to create family friendly services by detecting
and removing objectionable content. These providers face the risk
of increased liabiHty if they police their systems . .. The CoxWyden amendment removes the liability of providers such as
Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort to edit the smut
from their systems. 141 Congo Rec. H. 8460, 8471 (August 5,
1995).

4

5

of ZERAN's distributor claims was not inconsistent with §
230 (c) and the court erred in holding that it was barred.

Also, in addition to the obvious effect the decisions
below are having on burgeoning OSP litigation, the impact
of this case transcends the fate of ZERAN- it potentially
reaches into the lives of millions of Americans and renders
them vulnerable to computer-based crime without a
remedy. 8 And as the presence of computers grow more
ubiquitous in our everyday life, the fallout of the lower court
opinions will be magnified.

2. This Case Squarely Presents an Important
Issue of Federal Law with Significant Practical
Consequences.

Paradoxically, on one hand AOL characterizes this
case as not deserving of certiorari because it does not create
a split in the courts (AOL Opp. 7- 8), and on the other,
counsels the court to await further study in the lower courts.
(AOL Op. ft. 7). Of course, after this due study, should a
court refuse to follow the Fourth Circuit opinion, AOL will
undoubtedly be back before this Court seeking certiorari,
extolling the public importance of resolving the reach of the
CDA.
Rather than being a basis for denying certiorari, the
landmark status of this case presents an important question
of first impression, a ground for granting certiorari the
Court has acknowledged countless times. Moreover, as
demonstrated by AOL's citation of trailing cases (AOL Opp.
8-9) that have uniformly relied on the lower court decisions
in this case6 the reach of the CDA presented in this appeal
will undoubtedly spawn recurring litigation.?

e.g. In Blumenthal v. Drudge. 1998 WL 195979 (D.D.C April 22,
1998) the court found "The court in Zeran has provided a complete
answer to plaintiffs' primary argument, an answer grounded in the
statutory language and intent of Section 230."

6

The in pres~ article cited by Petitioner (Pet. 19) has now been
published, Bailon, Defamation and Preemption Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Why The Fourth Circuit's Ruling in
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. is Wrong, Journal of Internet Law, March
1998,6-13.

7

The Court has an opportunity to revitalize
Congress' expressed standards of conduct for the coming
millennium. The Court should not await "percolation" in
the courts below of an erroneous construction of a federal
statute which would bar access to both state and federal
courts for persons injured as a result of the negligence of
proprietary, private OSP's like AOL. Rather, it should decide
this important, unsettled question of federal statutory law of
broad public interest and safety.
3. This Case Has No Other Impediments to the
Grant of Certiorari.

None of the traditional bases for denial of certiorari
exist-the decision is not grounded on unique facts and there
are no seriously disputed facts 9 ; the case comes to the Court

8 In Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 Albany L.
Rev. 147 (1997), the author asserts that imposing liability on the provider
is likely the only way to protect a defamed plaintiff, observing:

This is particularly applicable to Zeran. AOL after all controlled
its own servers, and Zeran had no ability to remove the
defamatory messages himself. Furthermore, since neither Zeran
nor AOL could identify the person who posted the messages,
Zeran could neither motivate that person to remove them nor sue
him for damages. Id. at 173.

6

7

from a grant of judgment on the pleadings, a well-worn
path to the Court; there are no procedural defects or any
likelihood that the dispute might be rendered moot or that the
Court might decide another case in the interim which would
justify a granted, vacated and remand treatment. In short, the
case has none of the shortcomings which, can result in a
denial of certiorari.

defense to such liability, it would immediately urge that it
was "unfair" to "attach new consequences to a completed
act". Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1501.

B. The Retroactivity of the CDA

1. The Circuit Court's Retroactive Application
of the CDA to ZERAN's Claim Conflicts with the
Court's Latest Retroactivity Cases.
AOL asserts that the Circuit Court's opinion is
consistent with Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.
244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Us. ex reI. Schumer,
U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1871. (AOL Opp.
19-23). In essence, AOL would characterize the denial of
any remedy to ZERAN for injuries suffered prior to the
enactment of the CDA arising from completed conduct
which occurred (and all elements of liability had ripened)
long prior to the CDA as not being "unfair" under Landgraf
(AOL Opp. 21).10 Of course, were AOL to be deprived of a

However, AOL repeats the mistake committed by the Circuit Court that
"Shortly after being contacted by Zeran, AOL deleted the messages."
(AOL Opp.2). To the contrary, the Complaint does not aUege that AOL
deleted tIle posting, but only that on Aprjl 28, 1995, ZERAN was told by
an AOL servi-ce representative that it would be deleted (~ 16, Comp'lamt)
and that he received the same promise on May 2, 1995. (~28).

9

10 AOL acknowledges that the "presumption against retroactivity is
designed to avoid the unfairness of changing the legal rules when a
person has engaged in conduct with an expectation of the probable legal
consequences", but asserts that ZERAN failed to sufficiently establish his
reliance. (AOL Opp. 22). However, it is unclisputed that both AOL and
ZERAN considered AOL a distributor, not a publisher, and entitled to
notice. AOL's reliance upon the settled state of law pre-CDA was also

AOL also claims that a statute eliminating
jurisdiction can be applied to pre-enactment events, so as to
"deny a litigant a forum for his claim entirely", citing Justice
Scalia concurring in Landgraf (AOL Opp. 23). However,
the Court recently held in Hughes Aircraft Co. that
jurisdictional statutes effect only where a suit may be
brought not whether it may be brought at all. 117 S.Ct. at
1878. Nothing in the majority opinion in Landgraf or
Hughes Aircraft Co. would allow the CDA to be exempt
from the general presumption against retroactivity so as to
deprive ZERAN of any forum in which to bring his claims.
The retroactive application of the CDA, especially
when Congress knows exactly how to retroactively apply
litigation barriers and chose not to do so in the CDA, creates
not only "potential" unfairness, but concrete, actual
unfairness to Zeran and others similarly harmed.
The Court should grant certiorari on the retroactivity
issue because the opinion below conflicts with this Court's
retroactivity jurisprudence.

CONCLUSION
Because this appeal presents important Issues of
federal law with significant
practical
consequences,
manifestly represents the first of many recurring
cases,
presents profound questions for our country's expanding online future, and offers the Court the opportunity to choose
which road on the information superhighway we shall travel,

established in the pleadings. The application of the CDA to bar
ZERAN'S recovery undoubtedly has retrospective effect.
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the Court should grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
and afford this case the full consideration of the Court.
DATED:

May 28, 1998
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